A decentralized approach for optimal wholesale cross-border trade planning using multi-agent technology by Yen, J et al.
Title A decentralized approach for optimal wholesale cross-bordertrade planning using multi-agent technology
Author(s) Wei, P; Yan, Y; Ni, Y; Yen, J; Wu, FF
Citation Ieee Transactions On Power Systems, 2001, v. 16 n. 4, p. 833-838
Issued Date 2001
URL http://hdl.handle.net/10722/42887
Rights
©2001 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. However,
permission to reprint/republish this material for advertising or
promotional purposes or for creating new collective works for
resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or to reuse any
copyrighted component of this work in other works must be
obtained from the IEEE.
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON POWER SYSTEMS, VOL. 16, NO. 4, NOVEMBER 2001 833
A Decentralized Approach for Optimal Wholesale
Cross-Border Trade Planning Using Multi-Agent
Technology
Ping Wei, Student Member, IEEE, Yonghe Yan, Yixin Ni, Senior Member, IEEE, Jerome Yen, and
Felix F. Wu, Fellow, IEEE
Abstract—Over the past decade, power industry has been un-
dergoing deregulations to introduce competitions among market
participants. Once centralized decision making must now adapt
to the new market structure. The optimal cross-border electricity
trade planning is an important issue in interconnected power sys-
tems under transmission open access. In this paper a decentralized
approach is suggested to solve the problem using multi-agent tech-
nology. In the new approach rational market participants make
decisions based on their own benefits, in the meantime the min-
imum production and transmission cost of the whole system can be
reached without a central coordination except necessary informa-
tion exchange through media like the Internet. A relevant lemma
has been proven. The approach is implemented via a multi-agent
system using Java programming language. Computer tests on a
5-area test system show that the suggested new approach is effec-
tive and promising.
Index Terms—Cross-border trade plan, decentralized optimiza-
tion, multi-agent technology, power market.
I. INTRODUCTION
OVER the past decade, electric power systems have beenundergoing deregulations to introduce competitions
among market participants, see [1], [2]. Transmission open
access for suppliers and customers is one of the most pre-
vailing unbundling services [3], [4]. It requires the owners of
transmission systems to allow other wholesale entities to use
transmission capacities to transport electrical energy without
discrimination.
Usually interconnected power systems are geographically
owned by several regional investors and the regional systems
are connected together through tie-lines. The electricity trade
inside a regional system can be handled locally. While the elec-
tricity trades among regional systems should pay for the usage
of tie lines and the regional networks along the transaction
paths [5]. It is clear that wholesale cross-border trades should
be considered together with the transmission cost with tie line
capacity limits included.
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There are two basic approaches to handle the wholesale cross-
border trade schedule. One is the centralized scheduling ap-
proach where the market operator is responsible to work out
an optimal cross-border transmission schedule to satisfy the de-
mands at the minimum production and transmission cost with
consideration of system operation constraints and then allocates
the transmission cost to individual transactions. This kind of
centralized scheduling approach is widely used in the world
now, say in California [6], England [7], et al., and various cen-
tralized optimization methods can be used for this task. Details
of this topic can be found in [8] and [9]. As for the cost alloca-
tion task, [10] suggests a power flow based MW-mile method to
allocate the cost. Reference [11] proposed a physical-DC-flow-
based approach to allocate costs in which the transactions are
explicitly expressed. However, very often market participants
might doubt the fairness of the centrally announced results. Be-
sides the central optimization has to repeat together with asso-
ciated transmission cost allocation whenever a new transaction
is added.
The other approach is the decentralized scheduling, which
uses the invisible market hand, i.e., profit driving, to solve the
problem by market participants themselves. The pioneering
research was done by F. F. Wu, et al. [12]. They suggested
a new paradigm, where economic decision is carried out by
private multilateral trades among generators and consumers,
while the function of reliability is coordinated through the
PSO. Based on above idea, one implementation [13] uses the
Bilateral Shapley Value to negotiate in multilateral trades via
a multi-agent system. This approach avoids the centralized
decision making of the market operator and is quite attractive
to market participants. However, the optimal social welfare is
not guaranteed.
In this paper, we are going to suggest a new decentralized
method base on the rule of “first come, first serve” to imple-
ment the cross-border trade planning, which can encourage
the market participants to compete for the system resources in
advance. This point is demonstrated through the computer test
results later. In the new decentralized method each regional
system makes its own decision on cross-border trades, which
is beneficial to itself without a central coordinating figure.
However, it is proven in the paper that the total transmission
cost minimized after such “selfish” decisions. The significant
advantage of this approach lies in that it is based on each par-
ticipant’s rational behavior and any unfair central scheduling
can be avoided.
0885–8950/01$10.00 © 2001 IEEE
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The suggested approach is successfully implemented with the
help of Internet and related technologies, such as, World-wide
Web (WWW) and Multi-agent Technology (MAT). Essentially,
MAT is viewed as part of a wider area of Distributed Artificial
Intelligence with each agent as an intelligent software agent
[14]. In our MAT system, each regional system acts as an
autonomous agent with the market information transmitted
through Internet. So the agents are distributed, independent
and intelligent soft “robots” for decision making. One more
agent is assigned for central information handling. And the
MAT system provides a flexible and effective platform for
their interaction. Through this approach, the transparency and
efficiency of market operation can be reached.
We shall first present the mathematical model of the problem
in its centralized optimal format. Then our decentralized ap-
proach is introduced. The lemma that our approach is consistent
to the centralized optimal result is proved thereafter. The sug-
gested approach has been implemented using multi-agent tech-
nology. A 5-area test system is used to show the relevant cal-
culation and the consistence of our method with central optimal
approach. The computer test results show that the suggested new
approach is effective and promising.
II. MATHEMATICAL MODEL
The basic assumptions used in our study are as follows:
a) The transmission price of each tie line is a constant and
announced in $ per unit power flow. The transmission
limits of tie lines are known in per unit. For simplicity,
the transmission loss is neglected (its cost can be included
approximately into the tie line transmission price) and the
power flow of each tie line is controllable.
b) An area is clarified as a supply, demand or transit area if its
net injection power is greater than, less than or equal
to zero. is the net injection capacity of area when
. The net generation capacity for a supply
area and the load demand of a demand area are all
known.
c) There are enough generation capacities to meet the load
demands in the entire inter-connected system and the
tie-line capacity is enough so that all the demands can be
satisfied via proper schedule.
d) Although there is no central coordinator, all market infor-
mation (including network structures, announced prices
and available capacities, etc.) is made available on a con-
tinuously updated basis to all market participants through
a central server. And each participant behaves rationally
and pursues own interests.
For the wholesale cross-border trades scheduling problem,
the math model for the centralized optimal decision can be for-
mulated as follows:
for
for all
for all (1)
where
power flow on the tie-line from region to region
, and ;
capacity of the lie-line from region to region ;
price of per unit power flow for usage of tie-line
;
price of per unit power flow for usage of network
of area ;
denote supply, demand and transit area sets,
respectively;
entire tie line set with m directed tie-line flows;
total number of areas.
The three terms of the objective function in (1) are the total
costs for tie-line usage; the total fees for the usage of all supply
area networks; and the total fees for the usage of other area net-
works respectively. It should be noticed that the generation cost
is not included in the objective function for simplicity. There
is no difficulty to include generation cost of each supply area
into the problem. This is realized through introducing a ficti-
tious “supply area–tie line” set with the tie line transmission
price equal to the generation cost of the supply area. Then the
original supply area becomes a “transit” area in the new system.
Now we start to introduce our decentralized approach based
on the rule of “first come, first serve.” We shall prove that after
successive rational decisions of the cross-border trades by de-
mand areas the global optimal solution of (1) can be reached.
For ease of description, we number supply areas from 1 to
, transmit areas from to , and load areas from
to . The sequence of load numbers
also represents the sequence of requests for power supply, or
say the sequence of trade decision makings. Our decentralized
optimal approach is completed in three steps as follows.
Step 1) Based on the definition in (1), we begin with a
system without any cross-border transaction. Set
tie line power flow vector initial value as zero,
i.e., . Set area power vector initially as
with its th element equal to:
i.e., for a supply area (node) is its available ca-
pacity, for a demand area (node) is ( 1) times
its un-served demand.
Step 2) For (the first served demand area),
go through the following sub-steps.
a) Determine the cheapest path to get one unit
power from a supply area, say .
b) Augment -unit flow along
path from area to area , where
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, available capacity
along .
c) Update , and :
where
with the magnitude of equal to , is
the arc set of the path from to
d) Repeat steps ) to ) until , i.e., the
corresponding demand is totally served.
Step 3) Set , and conduct all sub-steps a)–d) in step
2). Repeat step 3) until . The
final optimal cross-border schedule can be known
from the tie line flow vector .
Lemma: The result from the decentralized approach above is
the same as that from the centralized approach defined in (1).
Proof: The lemma can be proven by the inductive method
as follows.
a) When , if the system has only one demand at node
and it can be served by a single cheapest path from
a source node with system constraints satisfied, i.e.,
available capacity along
(2)
It is clear that the corresponding tie line flow vector
is also the global optimal solution of (1) for . This
is because that there are no other demands in the system
and there are no other paths that are cheaper than the se-
lected path (otherwise the selected path wouldn’t be the
cheapest path, which conflicts with the known condition).
Therefore we have:
(3)
where is the corresponding centralized optimal solu-
tion [see (1)] when the system has unique demand 1.
If the demand at node can’t be served by only one
cheapest path because of system constraints, we can split
the demand properly into two demands with one of them
meeting the requirement as the first demand. So for the
first demand we can always have and the
corresponding transmission cost .
b) Suppose that when , there is
(4)
where is the tie line flow vector corresponding to
the minimal cost from centralized optimal approach [see
(1)] when demands 1 through are served; denotes
the resultant tie line flow vector after successive rational
decisions by demands 1 through individually using the
cheapest path approach with system constraints included.
Based on this assumption, we shall use “reduction to ab-
surdity” to prove in the next step when , the
rational decision by the th demand will lead to
.
c) When , we search a cheapest path from
available source areas to the th demand area (de-
noted as node ). If we consider the flow on the found
cheapest path as the system demand increment
:
available capacity
along
where is the source area number of the cheapest path
. If the corresponding tie line flow vector increment
is , we have:
Suppose the resultant is not the minimal cost flow
solution from the centralized optimal approach
for the load vector . Then the transmission cost
must be larger than , i.e.,
(5)
(Here we assume the global optimal solution is unique.)
Then in order to serve , we can constitute an-
other tie line flow increment vector as
(6)
Due to the linearity of the cost function, substituting (6)
into (5) and considering (4), we can rewrite (5) as:
(7)
It is obvious that (7) contradicts with the condition that
is the cheapest path for . Therefore (5)
is not true and must have minimum transmission
cost corresponding to for the load vector .
d) According to the proof, we know that when all the de-
mands are served one by one based on the cheapest-path
search at , the corresponding tie line flow vector
will also be the global optimal cross-border trade
solution of (1).
The advantages of the new approach are apparent:
a) There is no need for a central coordinator. Each demand
area searches for its cheapest path to satisfy its own need.
b) Every demand area is satisfied with its choice based on the
available cheapest path and does not need to worry about
the bias from central processing.
c) The minimal total transmission cost can still be guaranteed
at the end with system constraints satisfied.
d) Since the method is based on the rule of “first come, first
serve,” when a new trade is added, previous trade sched-
ules will not change. This is extremely attractive as com-
pared with centralized optimization approaches.
e) The new approach does not need transmission cost allo-
cation calculation since it can obtain transmission cost of
each trade during the process.
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Fig. 1. Infrastructure of MASCBTP.
f) The area power generation cost can also be included easily
by introducing a fictitious “supply area–tie line” set as
mentioned before.
III. IMPLEMENTATION
The new suggested method has been implemented on the In-
ternet using multi-agent technology. The developed system is
called MASCBTP (Multi-agent System for Cross-border Trade
Planning). Fig. 1 shows the infrastructure of MASCBTP. Agent
communication is done via the Internet. The agent name server
manages the agent registration service and other administration
tasks. The security server is responsible for approving cross-
border trade requests from the participating agents according
to system constraints and the rule of “first come first serve,”
and it is also responsible for updating the information after each
approval. The two servers can be merged into one. In view of
the suggested decentralized approach, the security server is not
necessary since all the decisions can be rationally made and an-
nounced by the individual agents themselves. But for the prac-
tical implementation, we suggest a central server to guarantee
the security of the system and to improve the speed of the pro-
cessing and system management.
Each regional network is assumed to be a rational agent
and the communication channels are also assumed to be
perfect. Based on the information updated by the security
server, each demand agent installed with similar software
searches the cheapest path to meet its own demand. A generic
label-correcting algorithm is used in MASCBTP to compute
the cheapest path. The algorithm is a general procedure for
successively updating the cost labels until they satisfy the
cheapest path optimality condition. The details of the algorithm
can be found in [15].
After an agent has made its decision, it will send its request to
the security server. If the security server approves the request ac-
cording to the rule of “first come first serve,” it will announce the
information via the Internet. Then under the new environment,
other agents will begin a new round of calculation and compete
for the cheapest path to supply their un-served demands. The
process will continue till all the demands are satisfied.
IV. COMPUTER TEST RESULTS
A 5-area test system [16] (see Fig. 2) is used for computer
test and to show how our method works based on multi-agent
technology.
In Fig. 2, each bigger circle represents a regional network
connected by tie lines to other networks. The number inside a
circle represents the assumed transmission cost of per unit flow
Fig. 2. The test system schematic diagram.
Fig. 3. Illustration of calculation process of case 1.
for transit through the regional systems. Each tie line has two
parameters put in a parenthesis. The first number represents the
transmission cost for per unit flow and the second number the
transmission capacity of the tie line. The number by the side
of a generator (or a demand) means the available generation
capability (or the amount of load demand).
For simplicity generation cost is assumed to be the same and
neglected in optimization. Two cases are studied: in case 1 agent
D sends its request first; and in case 2 agent E does it first. The
results are presented below.
Case 1: The request from agent D is sent first.
1st Round: The cheapest path for agent D is the path B–D
with per unit flow cost equal to (8 2 4 14). Because of
the generation capacity limit, agent B can only supply 300-unit
power. Agent D has to find another cheapest path for the rest
of demand from A through B to D with the transmission cost
rate 17, as illustrated by Fig. 3(a). After the cheapest cost cal-
culation, agent D sends its request for these two trades to the
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Fig. 4. Illustration of calculation process of case 2.
security server. At the same time, agent E is also calculating the
cheapest trades as shown in Fig. 4(a), and sends the request to
the security server as well. However, the request from agent D
arrives first and gets approved first. The information is then up-
dated as shown in Fig. 3(b).
2nd Round: Based on the updated information, agent E finds
the cheapest path is A–B–D–E with the cost rate 23. Due to
the transmission capacity limit of tie line D–E, only 200-unit
power can be supplied along the path. Then agent E tries to find
another cheapest path for the rest of demand. It is A–B–C–E
with the cost rate 26, as shown in Fig. 3(c). The security server
will approve the request from E for the two trades.
At the end of processing, all the demands are met. And every
load area obtains the available cheapest paths for their trades
under existing circumstances. According to Fig. 3(a) and (b),
we know the transmission price for agent D is 4200 3400
7600 and for agent E is 4600 15 600 20 200. The total
transmission cost is 7600 20 200 27 800.
Case 2: The request of agent E is sent first.
1st Round: Based on the initial information shown in Fig. 2,
agent E calculates the cheapest path to meet its demands. It finds
the path B–D–E with the cost rate 20. Due to the transmission
capacity limit of tie line D–E, this trade can only be 200-unit
power. Then the second cheapest path is found to be B–C–E
with the cost rate 23. However due to the limitation of genera-
tion capacity, the magnitude of the trade is limited to 100-unit
power. The last cheapest path is A–B–C–E with the cost rate
26 and the demand of agent E is finally satisfied. The request
for the three trades [see Fig. 4(a)] is sent to security server. In
the mean time, agent D also calculates its cheapest trade plan as
shown in Fig. 3(a), but it sends out a little later. So the security
server approves the request from agent E first. And the updated
information is shown in Fig. 4(b).
2nd Round: Based on the updated information, agent D cal-
culates the cheapest path again and sends the request to the se-
curity server. The cheapest path is from A through B to D with
the cost rate 17 shown in Fig. 4(c). The trade is 500-unit power.
In case 2 agent D should pay 8500 for cross-border trades
which is more expensive than it paid in case 1, however agent
E will only pay 4000 2300 13 000 19 300 for its trades,
which is cheaper than 20 200 it paid in case 1. It is easy to prove
that the winner in the competition for the cheapest path is the one
who gets most benefits [17], which is consistent with the rule of
“first come, first serve.” It is clear that under such scheme, each
market participant is encouraged to corner system resources for
its own benefit in advance. The earlier it makes decision, the
more benefits it can obtain.
A summary of the trade costs is listed in Table I. In case 1,
agents D and E paid 7600 and 20 200 respectively. In case 2,
agents D and E paid 8500 and 19 300 respectively. The total
transmission cost is 27 800 for both cases, which is also equal
to the result of centralized optimization defined in (1). The re-
sultant power flow for cases 1 and 2 and the centralized optimal
approach are the same, which is shown in Fig. 4(d).
It should be pointed out again that using the decentralized ap-
proach, no further transmission cost allocation is required since
it is implemented in parallel with the decentralized process,
which makes the method more attractive than the centralized
approaches.
Due to the same final power flow shown in Fig. 4(d), each
participant receives same amount of money in the different cases
(see the last column of Table I).
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a decentralized approach to make
cross-border trade planning using multi-agent technology under
transmission open access, in which each market participant
making decision independently to seek its own profit, i.e., to
compete for the cheapest path. The advantage of this approach
lies in that no centralized control is required to guarantee the
autonomous behavior, but minimum transmission cost of the
whole system can be achieved finally, which is proven in the
paper. Furthermore, when a new trade is added, it will use
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TABLE I
COST ALLOCATION (IN MONEY UNITS)
remaining transmission resources, therefore previous trade
schedules will not change, and the system-wide re-coordination
calculations, usually required in centralized approach through
OPF, are avoided.
The approach is successfully implemented through a multi-
agent system called MASCBTP using Java programming lan-
guage. Computer tests on a 5-area system show that the sug-
gested approach is effective and promising.
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